By Miguel Mauricio
In a decision addressing inverse condemnation and constitutional takings claims, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed claims brought against the City of Los Angeles arising from alleged property damage caused by adjacent private development. The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a viable claim under the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and related state law theories because the alleged harms were not attributable to a governmental taking or public use. The opinion provides important guidance on the limits of inverse condemnation liability and the distinction between private construction impacts and government action for purposes of constitutional takings claims. [De La Cruz v. City of Los Angeles, ___F.Supp.4th___, Case No. CV-24-____ (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2026).]
Factual and Statutory Background
The case arose from the construction of a multi-story residential development adjacent to the plaintiff’s property in Los Angeles.
The plaintiff alleged that the neighboring project, a six-story apartment building, caused substantial physical impacts, including structural damage, loss of lateral support, and interference with the use and enjoyment of her property. That adjacent project was approved by the City of Los Angeles via state mandates for the city to provide additional “affordable” housing within a transportation corridor.
The plaintiff asserted that the City of Los Angeles approved and permitted the development without adequate safeguards, thereby facilitating the alleged harm. Based on these allegations, the plaintiff brought claims under the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, as well as related state-law theories of inverse condemnation and nuisance. The claims were premised on the theory that the City’s approval and regulatory oversight of the project effectively resulted in a taking or damaging of private property for public purposes.
Procedural History
The plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court asserting constitutional and state-law claims against the City. The City moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a taking attributable to government action. Specifically, the City contended that the alleged damages resulted from private construction activity, not from any public project or government appropriation of property rights.
The District Court evaluated the sufficiency of the pleadings under federal standards governing motions to dismiss and considered whether the alleged facts, if true, could support a viable takings or inverse condemnation claim.
The U.S. District Court’s Decision
Takings Clause and Government Responsibility
The court began by outlining the fundamental requirements of a Fifth Amendment takings claim, emphasizing that liability attaches only where a plaintiff demonstrates that the government has taken or damaged private property for public use. The court noted that not all government approvals or regulatory actions give rise to takings liability; rather, there must be a sufficiently direct causal connection between governmental conduct and the alleged property deprivation.
Government Action Versus Private Conduct
The plaintiff argued that the City’s approval of the adjacent development constituted sufficient government involvement to support a takings claim. The court rejected this theory, holding that the City’s role as a permitting authority did not transform the private developer’s construction activities into government action.
The court emphasized that constitutional takings liability cannot be premised solely on a municipality’s approval of private development, even where that development results in physical impacts to neighboring properties. Because the alleged damage stemmed from private construction rather than a public project or government-directed activity, the plaintiff failed to establish the threshold requirement of government action.
Public Use Requirement
The court further explained that a valid takings claim requires that the alleged property deprivation occur for a public use. Here, the development at issue was a privately constructed residential project, and the complaint did not plausibly allege that the City appropriated the plaintiff’s property or caused damage in furtherance of a public use.
Absent allegations that the City itself occupied, controlled, or intentionally damaged the property for public purposes, the court concluded that the Takings Clause was not implicated.
Inverse Condemnation and Causation
Turning to the plaintiff’s inverse condemnation theory, the court reiterated that such claims require a showing that the government substantially caused or participated in the damaging of property. The court found that the complaint failed to allege facts demonstrating that the City’s conduct, beyond standard regulatory approval, was a substantial factor in causing the alleged harm.
The court distinguished cases involving public works or government construction projects, where inverse condemnation liability is more readily established, and concluded that the allegations here fell outside that framework.
In the end, in evaluating plaintiff’s federal taking claims, the court found as follows:
When one purchases a residential property, that property is subject to the zoning decisions of the local government. Plaintiffs have cited to no case in which a property owner has successfully maintained a takings claim involving the approval of a development on a neighboring parcel. The second Penn Central factor therefore does not support Plaintiffs’ federal takings claim.
The court went on to state:
Here, as the Complaint alleges “because the State of California . . . generally and the City of Los Angeles specifically have prioritized. . .the approval of certain high density housing projects that are built near public transportation hubs such as the [neighboring project]. . . at issue in this lawsuit” . . . the Complaint . . . admits that the approval of the development on the neighboring parcel advances the important public good of providing additional affordable housing. . . .Plaintiffs have therefore admitted. . .that the third Penn Central factor weighs against them.
And as to the plaintiff’s state law claims of inverse condemnation, the court held:
The mere appearance of a lawful structure on neighboring property cannot give rise to an action in inverse condemnation. . .which requires that the property “taken or damaged for public use” . . . unless we are to do violence to the words “taken or damaged” in the constitutional provision upon which such claims are founded. There is no authority for te proposition. . .that plantiff’s are entitled to compensation merely because a large, unattractive structure went up next door.
Conclusion and Implications
The U.S. District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, concluding that the alleged harms arising from adjacent private development did not constitute a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment or support an inverse condemnation claim against the City. The decision underscores the principle that government permitting and regulatory approval, without more, do not give rise to takings liability for impacts caused by private actors.
For practitioners and local agencies, the opinion clarifies the limits of municipal exposure in land use contexts, particularly where disputes arise from private development projects. It reinforces that constitutional and inverse condemnation claims require a clear nexus between government action and property damage, as well as a demonstrable connection to public use, rather than generalized allegations of regulatory involvement. The U.S. District Court’s opinion is available online at:
